Market equilibria of matching markets o er an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit with rather peculiar preferences of agents. ese preferences can be described by piece-wise linear concave (PLC) functions, which however, are not separable (due to each agent only asking for one item), are not monotone, and do not satisfy the gross substitute property-increase in price of an item can result in increased demand for the item. Devanur and Kannan in FOCS 08 showed that market clearing prices can be found in polynomial time in markets with xed number of items and general PLC preferences. ey also consider Fischer markets with xed number of agents (instead of xed number of items), and give a polynomial time algorithm for this case if preferences are separable functions of the items, in addition to being PLC functions.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of matching without money with n agents who have preferences over m items. is problem models a range of situations from assigning students to schools, applicants to jobs, or people to commi ees. We call such an assignment problem a matching problem, if all agents are required to get a xed number of items. An intuitive application is the school choice problem. Students have preferences over schools, and each student needs to get assigned to exactly one school. In this paper we will consider computing the fair randomized solution to this problem proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser [12] based on market equilibria.
We model the preferences of agents with the value of agent i for being assigned to item j is i j . Using values allows agents to express the intensity of their preferences. An important property of an allocation is its e ciency. Since agents utilities are meaningless to compare (without money, there is no natural unit to express utility), the best we can hope for is a Pareto-e cient allocation. An allocation is Pareto ine cient if there is an alternate allocation where no agent is worse o , and at least one agent has improved utility. We will consider fractional or randomized allocation. e value of an agent i for the fractional allocation x i j is j i j x i j , if it obeys the matching constraint. is is the agent's expected value, if x i j is the probability of assigning item j to agent i.
Market equilibria o er an intuitive, fair, and Pareto-e cient solution for problems of allocations of resources to agents who have their own (incomparable) preferences over the items in systems with no money. is was proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser [12] in the context of matching markets, and by Dolev et al. [9] (see also [11] and [13] ), in the context of allocation of resources in systems. e idea is to endow each agent with equal resource: a unit of (arti cial) money. A set of prices p for the items is market clearing, if there is a fractional allocation x of items to agents such that the following conditions hold (i) each item is allocated at most once, (ii) each agents is allocated her favorite set of items subject to the budget constraint 1 that j x i j p j ≤ 1, and (iii) the market clears, meaning that all items not fully allocated have price 0. Hylland and Zeckhauser [12] showed that such market equilibria is guaranteed to exists, see also Appendix C of the full version of our paper Alaei et al. [3] . We view the resulting fractional (or randomized) allocation x as a fair solution to the allocation problem without money, which is also clearly Pareto-e cient and envy-free (no agent prefers the allocation of another agent). 2 We are concerned with computing this solution e ciently.
Computing Market Equilibria and the Odd Demand Structure of Matching Markets. Market equilibrium problems where demands satisfy the gross substitute condition are well understood [7] , and can be computed e ciently. e demand structure of our matching problem does not satisfy the gross substitutability condition, which requires that decreasing the price of an item (while keeping all other prices xed) should never decrease the demand for that item. We show an example in Appendix B of the full version of this paper Alaei et al. [3] that decreased price can cause decreased demand in a matching markets. It is not hard to gain intuition for the phenomena: with the decreased price the agent could get her old allocation, and would have money le over. In other markets, money can be used to buy additional items. However, in a matching market additional money makes no sense, and instead, the agent may want to exchange his share of a cheaper and less favorable items (possibly the item whose price decreased) for share of a more valuable expensive items.
Devanur and Kannan [8] gave an algorithm to compute market equilibria in markets with a xed number of items, where agents have piece-wise linear concave (PLC) utility functions, despite the fact that PLC utility functions can give rise to demand not satisfying the gross substitute condition. ey also gave a polynomial time algorithm to compute market equilibria in markets with a xed number of agents, where agents have piece-wise linear concave and separable utility functions. ey leave as an open problem to give a polynomial time algorithm to compute market equilibria in markets with a xed number of agents and general PLC utilities that are not separable. We will show in Section 2 that demand structure of the matching market can be modeled by a piece-wise linear concave (PLC) utility function, which however, is neither separable nor monotone. is allows us to use the algorithm of [8] to nd a market equilibrium is the number of goods is xed, but leaves open the question whether market equilibrium can be found in polynomial time if the number of di erent agents is nite instead.
Our Results. We give a polynomial time exact algorithm for nding market equilibria of matching markets with a xed number of agents, extending the work of [8] to the case of matching markets with a xed number of agents, despite the fact that utilities describing matching markets are not separable. Our algorithm in Section 3 is based on the structural eorem 3.10, and explores a polynomial number of possible player utility values and allocation structures, 1 Note that agents have no use for the (arti cial) money and are simply optimizing their allocated item, subject to their budget. 2 An alternate way to arrive to the same solution concept is to assign each agent an equal share of each resource, and then look for an equilibrium of the resulting exchange market. To see that this results in an identical outcome, we can think of each agents trade, as a two step-process, where he rst sells all his allocated share on the market prices, and then uses the resulting money to buy his optimal allocation. and nds a market equilibrium in polynomial time when the number of agents is xed. e algorithm also extend to the case when there are only a nite number of di erent agent utility types.
In case of large number of items and nite number of agents, when each individual item is insigni cant, our allocation can be used for nding an approximately optimal integer solution. We achieve this by showing in Lemma 3.8 that we nd an allocation in which the number of items which are shared by the agents is O(n 2 ), which is constant when the number of agents is constant.
In Appendix A of the full version of this paper Alaei et al. [3] , we consider the problem with a xed number of goods.
In this case, the algorithm of [8] can nd market equilibria in polynomial time. We give a simpler algorithm which is tailored for matching markets. With m di erent goods and n agents, our algorithm enumerates a polynomial number of di erent set of prices and allocation structures for the equilibrium.
Related Work. e problem of fairly allocating items to unit demand agents without money has been studied extensively in both Economics and Computer Science literature. Perhaps the most well known solution to this problem is the random serial dictatorship (RSD) [1] -also known as random priority (RP) -in which agents are served sequentially according to a random permutation, and each agent in turn receives her most preferred item among the remaining ones.
Clearly, serial dictatorship is Pareto e cient, and as a result, RSD is ex post Pareto-e cient, i.e., Pareto-e cient given the order used. However, the expected allocation of RSD may not be Pareto-e cient, i.e., its not interim Pareto-e cient.
In Appendix B of the full version of this paper [3] , we give an example where the expected allocation of RSD can be Pareto improved just using the order of player preferences, showing that RSD may be Pareto-ine cient even with ordinal preferences.
An alternative solution called probabilistic serial (PS) was proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] which is both envy-free and Pareto-e cient with respect to ordinal preferences. e PS mechanism is, however, not Pareto-e cient with cardinal preferences. is is possible, as ordinal preferences are not always su cient for ranking the randomized (interim) allocations, (i.e., ranking of distributions over outcomes). e mechanism we study in this paper, based on market equilibrium from equal income, has been proposed in this context by Hylland and Zeckhauser [12] , is both envy-free and Pareto-e cient even with respect to cardinal preferences.
Note that neither PS nor the market equilibrium mechanism is strategy-proof. However, Zhou [14] shows that for n ≥ 3 agents there is no mechanism that is strategyproof, Pareto-e cient, and envy-free.
Hylland and Zeckhauser [12] proves that equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (see also Appendix C of the full version of our paper Alaei et al. [3] , and propose an exponential time algorithm for nding approximate equilibrium, whereas the current paper proposes an exact algorithm for computing equilibrium which runs in polynomial time when either the number of agents or the number of items is constant. Most of the recent work on the problem of assignment without money has been focused on analyzing the e ciency of RSD and PS mechanism under cardinal and/or ordinal preferences, e.g., Adamczyk et al. [2] , Bhalgat et al. [5] . e main techniques used in the current paper are based on the cell decomposition result of Basu et al. [4] which has also been used by Devanur and Kannan [8] to derive a polynomial time algorithm for a related market equilibrium computation problem. We show how to nd equilibria of matching problems in polynomial time when the number of agents is xed. In Appendix A of the full version of this paper [3] , we also give an algorithm to nd equilibria in matching markets with a xed number of goods. While the algorithm of [8] can be used for this la er case, our algorithm is simpler: we avoid some complications (for instance their primal dual technique for checking the market clearing conditions), and we use a simpler cell decomposition theorem. e case of xed number of agents has been Session 4a: Matching 2 EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA studied by [10] . However, they assume that the agents' utility functions are strictly concave and strictly monotone, which does not apply to our problem. ey also approximate the Walrasian equilibrium, while our main goal is to nd the exact value of equilibrium prices and allocations.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section we review the matching problem with additive preferences and the market equilibrium solution we aim to compute. en we'll discuss our main technical tool, the cell decomposition technique of Basu, Pollack, and Roy [4] .
e Matching Problem. e problem is de ned by a set of m items, and C j ≥ 0 amount available of item j, and a set of n agents. e matching problem requires that we allocate exactly 1 unit of these items to all agents. e amount C j available of each item j may be very small, so the 1 unit allocated to an agent may need to be combined from small fractions of many di erent items. An allocation {x i j } for all agents i is a feasible solution of the matching problem, if
We assume agent i has value i j for a unit of item j. So her value for a set of {x i j } amounts of each item j is j i j x i j , assuming j x i j = 1.
More generally, we can require to allocate di erent amounts for di erent agents, and allow the matching constraint to be only an upper bound, that is, allocate at most 1 unit to each agent. For simplicity of presentation, in this paper we will use equal amount required for the agents, and normalize that value to 1. Further, we will assume, also for simplicity of the presentation only, that j C j = n, so a feasible solution to the matching problem will fully allocate all items.
Fair Allocation: Matching Market. We use the Fisher market proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser [12] to make the allocation fair. Fisher market is de ned by giving each agent a unit of (arti cial) money. A market equilibrium is de ned by a set of prices p j ∈ R ≥0 for each item j. Given a set of prices, the agent i's optimization problem can be wri en as follows:
A market equilibrium for this market is a set of prices p, and a feasible allocation x such that (i) x i is an optimal solution to agent i's optimization problem with respect to prices p and her budget of 1 unit of money. Note that the requirement of market clearing that all items are allocated, is automatically satis ed due to the matching constraint and our assumption that j C j = n.
Session 4a: Matching 2 EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA e matching constraint in the agents' preferences creates an odd demand structure. For some prices the agent's optimization problem is not feasible, and even on prices when all agent optimization problems are feasible, the preferences do not satisfy the gross substitute property, i.e increasing price of an item may increase the demand of that item, as explained in the introduction, and an example is shown in Appendix B of the full version of this paper [3] .
A natural idea to convert the problem to one with a simpler structure is to allow agents to have free disposal, i.e., if assigned more than 1 unit of item, they value the best unit. Unfortunately, this change in the model signi cantly changes the structure of the problem, and can result in market equilibria that are simply not feasible for the original problem. Consider the following market with 2 agents and 2 items.
Let 1 = (2, 1) and 2 = (0, 1). Assume that the prices are p = (0.5, 1.5). When agent's have free disposal, these prices are equilibrium, since
is optimal for both agents, and also clears the market. However, with matching market preferences these prices are not equilibrium, since A 1 will not get any of I 2 and A 2 cannot a ord all of I 2 so the prices are not market clearing. We note that it is possible to express this matching market problem as a classical Fisher market with agent preferences that are piece-wise linear and concave (general PLC) functions, though non-monotone and non-separable. To do this, we rst relax the matching constraint in the agents' optimization problem to requiring only that j x i j ≤ 1. We will show that the market clearing condition of a Fisher market requiring that all items are allocated (or have 0 price) will help to enforce that all agents get exactly 1 unit. We can also express the agents' utility as a piece-wise linear and concave function. To do this, let * i = max j i j + ϵ where ϵ > 0. Let agent i's utility for an allocation x i
When j x i j ≤ 1, the rst term is smaller, but when j x i j ≥ 1 the minimum is taken by the second term, so the total value strictly decreases as the allocated amount exceeds 1. Since the agent's utility decreases with more than one unit allocated, an optimal solution to the agent's optimization problem will allocate at most 1 unit of item to each agent, and hence if the market clears, this is also a solution to the matching market problem.
Devanur and Kannan [8] provides a polynomial time algorithm to nd the equilibrium prices and allocation for the case with xed number of goods. In Appendix A of the full version of this paper [3] , we give a simpler exact algorithm for this case, taking advantage of the matching structure. Our main result is to extend this to the case of xed number of agents, instead of xed number of items. [8] also o ers an algorithm for nding market clearing prices for with xed number of agents, but only with separable PLC utilities, i.e., when the utility of each agent is a separable function of the items allocated to the agents. Note that the utility function of a matching problem is necessarily not separable, as it needs to express the upper bound on the total allocation.
e Cell Decomposition Technique. Our algorithms will search the space of optimal utility values of each agent, and for each possible utility value, will search through the possible structures of allocations. ere are only a xed number of Session 4a: Matching 2 EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA agents, however, the space of possible optimal values is huge. We use a cell decomposition technique to make the search space discrete, facilitated by a characterization of equilibria. e beginning of Section 3 has a more detailed outline.
A main technical tool for our work will be the following theorem concerning the way polynomials divide the space in a d dimensional space. Given a set of polynomials on M variables, the sign of the polynomials de ne an equivalence between vectors in the M dimensional space R M , where two vectors and are equivalent if all polynomials have the same sign on and . We call the equivalence sets of this relations the cells of the way the polynomials divide up the space. In principle N functions can divide up the space into at many as 3 N cells (as each polynomial can be 0 positive or negative). However, Basu, Pollack, and Roy [4] showed that bounded degree polynomials in small dimensional spaces de ne much fewer cells.
If we have a set of M number of variables, and N number of polynomials whose degree is at most d, then the number of non-empty cells, and the time required to enumerate them is
We will use this decomposition to nd the equilibrium for our matching problem. To illustrate the idea, and let R n be the space of all possible agent utilities. Roughly speaking the idea is as follows. If we could describe whether a set of utilities u ∈ R n arises from an equilibrium by the signs of a few bounded degree polynomials in these variables, then we could use eorem 2.1 to enumerate all cells de ned by these polynomials, and test which of the cells satis es the condition required for being an equilibrium. Unfortunately, the equilibrium condition cannot be described this way, so we will need to introduce additional variables (helping us infer the prices and assignment, despite the fact that these are not in xed dimensional space) to be able to carry out this plan.
COMPUTING MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH FIXED NUMBER OF AGENTS
In this section, we give an exact algorithm to nd an equilibrium in the case where the number of agents n is constant, and the number of di erent goods is an arbitrary number m ∈ N, under the mild technical assumption that each agent has a unique most preferred item. More formally, for every agent i ∈ [n], there is exactly one item j such that i j = max k ∈[m] ( ik ). e goal of this section is proving the following theorem. T 3.1. Exact equilibrium (prices and allocations) in a matching market with xed number of agents, in which agents have additive values one unit of money, and a unique most preferred item, can be found in polynomial time.
General Outline and Techniques. Our algorithm searches the space of agents' optimal utilities and item prices to nd an equilibrium. We divide this space into a polynomial number of cells, where each cell contains utility and price vectors that have the same properties. We use eorem 2.1 as the basis of the cell decomposition. e space of possible agent utilities is nite dimensional. However, since the number of items is not constant, we cannot use a separate variable for each item price. In section 3.1, we provide a bundling technique and a characterization of the equilibrium structure that allow us to de ne equilibria using only a nite set of variables.
Cell. Consider the vector of player utilities u = {u i }, a constant dimensional space for xed number of agents. Now consider the linear functions u i − i j for each agent i and item j. A cell of the space of utilities u de ned by these functions is the region of this space in which each of these functions has a xed sign. Within each region, the items are divided for each agent i into those with value above u i , same as u i , and below u i . is division also has implications on prices: if the utilities are part of an equilibrium, the price p j of any item j with value i j > u i will have to be above 1. We will add further variables and polynomials, until each cell provides enough information for checking all the equilibrium properties. for the price vector, where for any xed structure, we can de ne all item prices via a xed number of variables. To do this, for each agent we will x a special item that is at least partially allocated to the agent. Lemma 3.6 will show that given prices for the xed number of special items, we can infer prices for all items.
Finally, we also need to be able to nd the assignment variables. We will show in Lemma 3.8 that each pair of agents only shares a few items (at most 5), and given the set of shared items, as well as the utilities and item prices, the allocation can be fully determined. Our algorithms iterates over all structures of specially assigned items and shared sets of items. For each of these structures, the algorithm iterates over all cells of the cell-decomposition given by agent utilities and prices of special items and the constraint (polynomials) described in the next subsections that ensure that these describe an equilibrium, and nds the ones which correspond to equilibria. 3 Bundles. Rather than thinking about individual items in isolation, it is useful to think of items in pairs. In equilibria each agent spends exactly one unit of money and gets exactly a total of one unit of items. is means that in equilibrium, if an agent gets some amount an item whose unit price is less than one, she should also get some amount of an item whose unit price is more than one. As suggested by this fact, we pair items of price below and above 1. We de ne a bundle as either a single item of price 1, or fractions of two items of a total of one unit of items, where the total unit price of the bundle is exactly 1. First, we show that in a market equilibrium, the allocations of items to agents, can be rewri en as the allocation of bundles to agents. c. e optimum allocation of items to agent i satisfying the matching constraint can be rewri en as allocation of bundles. P . Let p be an equilibrium pricing and x be an arbitrary allocation associated with p. For each agent i, we know that the total allocation of items to i and the the total cost of i's items is 1 (due to the market clearing condition), i.e. p j x i j = 1
We start rewriting i's allocation with bundles. Let ib be the amount of bundle b that i uses in the new allocation ( ib is zero at the beginning). At each step we consider the following cases
(1) For every j that x i j > 0, we have p j = 1: in this case all such items should be in a bundle b = (j) ( ib = x i j ), so our claim is correct.
(2) ere exists j that x i j > 0 and p j > 1: is means that there exists another item j such that p j < 1 and x i j > 0, otherwise if i gets t unit of items, her total cost cannot be t (note that t = 1 here). So by the de nition, j and j should be in a bundle b = (j, j ).
Let z = min(
In the second case, we increase ib by z, and reduce x i j by zα b and x i j by z(1 − α b ). is means that both the total cost of remaining allocation of x and the total remaining items in allocation of x decrease by z. Note that by doing this the total allocation of i (counting her allocation in x i and i ) does not change. Furthermore, either x i j or x i j becomes zero.
If we repeat this process, i gives us a way to rewrite the allocation of items to i as an allocation of some bundles (B i ) to i. If we repeat this for all the agents, we get what we want. 
P
. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that y is the allocation of bundles to agents. Also assume that there exists an agent i and a bundle b for which ib > 0 but there exists another bundle b such that ib < ib . Since the unit price of the bundles is 1, and there is one unit of items in them, i can trade her share of b for the same amount of b and increase her value. is is a contradiction. Now since the unit values of bundles that i uses are the same, and i gets exactly one unit of bundles, her utility in equilibrium is equal to the unit value of these bundles. So the second claim is also true.
A key observation for using the bundles to de ne prices in Lemma 3.6 is the following exchange property of optimal bundles. 
. We prove this lemma by using contradiction. W.l.o.g assume that b B i . If in equilibrium i trade her bundles to get ib > 0 unit of b and ib > 0 unit of b , then by lemma 3.3, her value will not change. Now, since x i j > 0 and x ik > 0, similar to proof of lemma 3.2, we can rewrite her allocation so that it includes some of b , and similarly rewrite the remaining allocation of i with other bundles. Since the unit value of i for b is less than value of i in equilibrium, this is a contradiction with corollary 3.3 and we are done.
Characterizing the Prices and Optimum Bundles with Polynomials
In this subsection we de ne a set of variables and polynomials that help us determine agent utilities and prices of all items at equilibrium. We consider assignments in the next subsection.
For each agent i, we de ne a variable u i which is i's utility in the equilibrium. By Lemma 3.2, we know that any equilibrium allocates bundles to agents, where each agent only gets one unit of her optimum bundles B i . Since we did not de ne variables for the prices yet, we cannot use prices to de ne bundles, so we start by de ning a set of item bundles for each agent just based on the fact from Corollary 3.3 that optimum bundles must give value u i . For each agent i, we de ne a candidate bundle to be the items whose value is u i , or the pair of items j and k such that i j < u i < ik , so there exists a unique 0 < α i jk < 1 such that α i jk i j + (1 − α i jk ) ik = u i . Note that the optimum bundles of i also satisfy this constraint (by Corollary 3.3). is means that the optimum bundles of an agent is a subset of her candidate bundles. In addition, the price of optimum bundles is exactly 1.
In order to nd the set of candidate bundles of agent i, we de ne a polynomial i j − u i for each agent i and item j. is way, each cell tells us for each item j, whether i j < u i , i j = u i or i j > u i . For any two items j, k ∈ [m], j and k form a candidate bundle if i j < u i and ik > u i . Similarly if for an item j, if u i = i j then j alone forms a candidate bundle. By the information provided by each cell, for each agent i ∈ [n] and item j, k ∈ [m] that form a candidate bundle, we de ne the ratio for the candidate bundle to be α i jk = u i −u k u j −u k . Not all the candidate bundles of agent i are in the set of her optimum bundles, since the price of optimum bundles should be exactly 1. We rst observe that the unit price of a candidate bundle cannot be less than 1. is property of candidate bundles is useful in proof of lemma 3.6, allowing us to infer all prices from prices on only a few items. L 3.5. In an equilibrium with prices p, all candidate bundles have price at least 1.
P . We prove this by contradiction. Assume that there exists an agent i such that the price of one her candidate bundles b is less than one. Assume that i's most preferred item is j. We have the following cases
In this case, since i's most preferred item is unique, there exists an ϵ > 0 such that if i gets 1 − ϵ unit of item z and ϵ unit of item j, her total price is still less than 1, but her utility is more than iz . is is a contradiction since by the de nition of candidate bundles, i's utility in equilibrium cannot be more than iz . • b = (j): In this case, we claim that x does not allocate any item to i other than j. Assume this is not true. If i trades whatever she gets in the equilibrium with j, her price will be less than 1, and since the maximum value for i is unique, her utility will increase. So it should be the case that i does not spend all her money and market will not be cleared. is is a contradiction with the assumption that the prices are market clearing. • b = (k, z): Since the maximum value item of i is unique, her value b should be less than i j . Now since the unit price of b is less than one, there exists ϵ > 0 such that ϵp j + (1 − ϵ)p b < 1. However, if i gets ϵ from item j and 1 − ϵ from bundle b, his utility is more than ib . is is a contradiction with the de nition of candidate bundles. So all the possible cases reach a contradiction and we are done.
Next we wish to nd the prices for all items. We will show that if one knows for each agent her utility, the price of only one item in her optimum bundles, and we use the set of candidate bundles de ned above, we can nd a the price of all the items which are in one of her optimum bundles. L 3.6. Consider an equilibrium where we know for each agent i, the utility u i of the agent, and the price of a single item j which is in a bundle of B i with two items. Using these values, and the notion of candidate bundles de ned above, we can nd the price of all items in polynomial time.
P
. e key for nding the prices is the observation that if for a bundle b = (j, k), we have α b and p j , then we can nd p k . is fact, combined with lemma 3.4, imply that if for each agent i, we know the price of one item in one of her optimum bundles, then we can nd the price of all the items in her optimum bundles. e only problem is that we do not know which one of her candidate bundles is also one of her optimum bundles.
Assume that for each agent i, we know a good i ∈ [m] is in one of her optimum bundles and we have a variable for i 's price. To nd a formula for price of other items with the variables we have de ned so far, consider the following 
for item j, then for each of her candidate bundles b = (k, j), she proposes price p k =
for item k. Finally she proposes price 1 for all the items which form a bundle alone. By doing this, if any of her proposed prices is chosen, that item will be in her optimum bundles. Now, for each item j, we, the game coordinator, choose the maximum price for j among all the prices which were proposed by the agents for j and set that to be the price of item j.
Note that in equilibrium, we have to choose the maximum proposed price, since if we choose less than that, the agents with higher proposals will have candidate bundles whose price is less than 1, this is a contradiction with lemma 3.5.
In order to use the above lemma, we should be able to do two things: (i) For each agent i, select an item j that is in one of i's optimum bundle with two items (if such an item exists), and set its price p j . (ii) For each item j, nd the maximum proposed price among all the proposed prices for that item, with proposed price of 1 of items in single item candidate bundles for any agent (including agents with no special item). We can do the rst task by checking all possible assignments of the special items with de ning O(m n ) separate equilibrium structures for each possible selection of one special item assigned to each agent, and checking them separately. Since the number of agents is constant, the number of di erent equilibrium structures is polynomial. For each case, we use O(n) variables, one for agent utility, and one for the price of the proposed special items for agents. To de ne prices of other items, we use candidate bundles for each agent to de ne candidate prices, add polynomial comparing the expressions for candidate prices. e actual price of the item is the highest of all prices as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.6, which is now set uniquely in each cell. Note that if an agent i is proposing a price for an item j which is higher than the proposed price of another agent i and j is the special item of i , then this cell cannot contain equilibria. L 3.7. Consider the space of at most 2n variables including agents' utilities and price of one item in each agent's optimum bundles. Now we add O(mn 2 ) polynomials: comparing utilities to item values, and comparing candidate item prices using candidate budges, as de ned in Lemma 3.6, the sign of these polynomials gives us a formula for the price of each item as well as the set of optimum bundles of each agent.
Characterizing the Equilibria
In this section, we add a set of new variables and polynomials to the set of variables and polynomials de ned in Section 3.1, in order to determine whether each cell contains equilibria. e new variables will help us de ne assignments.
We cannot directly de ne a variable representing the allocation of all goods/bundles to agents, since the number of these is not constant.
e key idea is to show that for every equilibrium pricing, there is a speci c allocation of items to agents where the number of items which is being shared between multiple agents is very small, and the allocation has a special structure. is helps us to signi cantly reduce the number of variables needed to de ne allocations. Consider two agents i < j, and all items of price p k < 1 in sorted by price as shown by Figure 1 . We will show that there is an equilibrium allocation with only two of these items shared between i and j, and the structure indicated by the gure, and the analogous structure for items of price p k > 1. If we know the shared items, this structure helps us with nding the owner of the items which only have a single owner in the allocation, hence nding the allocation of each agent using allocation variables only for shared items. Before stating the properties of this allocation in Lemma 3.8, we have to de ne some notations. Items that j will not get Items that i will not get L ij s Fig. 1 . The nodes are the items in S (one side of G) that are in a optimum bundle of both i and j (i < j), which are sorted by their prices. The figure shows the items that i and j share (green nodes), the items that of i or j will not get in the special allocation (blue and yellow nodes). Consider a bipartite graph G = (S,T , E) in which vertices in S are the items with price less than 1 and vertices in T are the items with price more than 1. For simplicity, we sort items in each side of G by their price and break ties with items'
indexes. Figure 1 is one side of this bipartite graph. For each bundle, we put an edge in the graph which connects the two items in the bundle. For every pair of agents i and j, let B S i j = S ∩ (V (B i ) ∩V (B j )) and B T i j = T ∩ (V (B i ) ∩V (B j )). Furthermore, let H be the set of items whose price is 1 and let B H i be the optimum bundles of agent i which has exactly 1 item. For each pair of agents i and j, let L S i j and L T i j be the list of items in B S i j and B T i j sorted by their price in increasing order (break ties with index of the items), respectively, the set of items of price above 1 (and below 1) that are part of optimum bundles for both i and j. Figure 2 is showing a part of the above bipartite graph for a pair of agents. e following Lemma claims that there is an equilibrium allocation of a special structure suggested by Figure 1 : on each side of the bipartite graph the agents share at most two items, and the agent with lower index only gets items between the two shared items, while the agent with higher index only gets items outside this interval as shown by Figure 1 . e main idea of the proof is that given any equilibrium allocation, we can make each pair of agents that violate the properties trade their items, as illustrated by the Figure 2 . Note that the running time of this trading process is not important, since we only use it to show that for any equilibrium pricing an allocation with the desired structure exists. L 3.8. For every equilibrium pricing p, there exists an equilibrium allocation x of items to agents such that for every pair of agents i and j (1 ≤ i < j ≤ n) 1. ere are at most 2 items that X is allocating to both i and j on each side of G. Furthermore, if k and z are two items in S (T ) such that p k ≤ p z and i and j are sharing k and z, i only gets items between k and z in the order sorted by price, while j does not get any of the items from B S i j (B T i j ) whose whose position in L S i j (L T i j ) is between k and z in the order (see Figure 1 ). Fig. 3 . Red and green arrows shows the trades of items between agent i and j in proof of lemma 3.8.
2. ere is at most one item k in B H i ∩ B H j that is shared by i and j in x, and i only get items from B H i whose index is lower than k and j only gets items whose index is higher than k.
P
. Suppose that we have an allocation of bundles to agents y in an equilibrium. We want to reallocate these bundles so that it satis es the conditions of the lemma.
Assume that there exist two agents 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, such that there are tree bundles a 1 = (c 1 , d 1 ), a 2 = (c 1 , d 2 )
and a 3 = (c 1 , d 3 ) such that a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ B i and three bundles b 1 = (c 2 ,
and Y y is allocating id 1 , id 3 > 0 of a 1 and a 3 to agent i, and jd 2 > 0 of d 2 to agent j. Furthermore, assume that ic 1 , jc 2 > 0.
Since
So if we remove βz from id 1 and (1 − β)z from id 3 and add z to id 2 then the total cost of agent i will be the same. Similarly, if we add βz to jd 1 and (1 − β)z to jd 3 and remove z from jd 2 , then the total cost of j will not change. Furthermore, it is easy to see that doing this does not a ect the matching constraints. Figure 3 demonstrates this procedure. Now, we have to show that doing this does not change the utility of i and j. From the assumption that Y y is an equilibrium allocation, it follows that by doing this, the utility of i and j cannot increase. Assume that by doing this utility of agent i decreases. We have
is means that if agent i only use these three items with these ratios, he gets one unit of item, spends at most 1 unit of money and her utility will be more than u i . is is a contradiction. e argument for agent j is similar to the argument for agent i. For each pair of agents 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, we nd the cheapest item k and the most expensive item z in S that i owns, if there is an item r in between k and z in the ordered list of items in S that j owns, we switch the allocation we switch the ownership of these items until, one of the following cases happen
• j runs out of item r .
• i runs out of item k.
• i runs out of item z
Let Φ be a potential function which is equal to |S | minus the the position of highest positioned item that i owns in the ordered list, plus the position of the lowest positioned item that i owns in the ordered list, plus the number of items for which j is a shareholder and are between the the two in the ordered list. If we repeat the above procedure, each time this potential function will decrease by 1. Since the potential function is always non-negative, we cannot continue the above procedure forever. is means that at a er some iterations, we will reach an equilibrium allocation which satis es the rst condition for this pair of agents.
We repeat this procedure until such pair of agents and set of items with these properties do not exist. We also do the same to the allocation of items on the other side of G (T ) to agents. For the items in B H i ∩ B H j , one can also transfer items between i and j to satisfy the second condition by nding two items that violate the condition and switch their ownership. e procedure de ned for satisfying these conditions are an easier version of the previous procedure.
From now on, we focus on nding and characterizing the speci c equilibrium allocation which is guaranteed to exist by this lemma. By using Lemma 3.8, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] we can use 5 item indexes f S i j , r S i j , f T i j , r T i j , and h i j that tell us which items are shared by agent i and j. We can assume that we know what are these shared items by simply checking all the possible O(m 5n 2 ) of these combinations. At the start of the algorithm, we x the 5 shared items for each pair of agents and an item in optimum bundle of each agent (which we discussed in Section 3.1). We call this set of items associated with each agent and pairs of agents the structure of the equilibrium. For each such a structure, we will aim to decide if there is an equilibrium with the given structure.
When considering equilibria of a given structure, we de ne variables for the allocation of the at most 5n 2 shared items, but do not de ne variable for allocations of other items. Next we show that given the allocations of the shared items, we can (i) infer allocations of all other items using the structure of Lemma 3.8, and (ii) can also de ne polynomials whose sign will tell us if there is an equilibrium with the given structure and allocation of shared items.
Since all the items should be sold in the equilibrium, for each agent i, all the items that are in only in i's optimum bundles, should get allocated to i. Second, we have de ned a variable that indicates the share of each agent for the shared items. e only thing le is to consider items that are in the set of the optimum bundles of multiple agents, but are not shared by these agents. Lemma 3.8 helps us nd allocation of this set of items. We start with the agent with the lowest index (agent 1) and one side of G, say S. e items that agent 1 gets, are the ones that satisfy all the constraints given to us by second part of the lemma. In order to check whether for an item j all these constraints hold, for each agent i, we can look at the position of item j in L S 1i . If j's position is between position of f S 1i and r S 1i in the list, for all the choices of i > 1, then it satis es all the constraints. By lemma 3.8, we know this is a necessary and su cient condition for j to get allocated to agent 1. We do this for S and T separately, and remove the items that get allocated to agent 1. Now, we repeat this procedure for agent 2, but only check the constraints for agents i > 2, then remove the items that agent 2 gets. We repeat this for rest of agents based on their indexes. We can do the same procedure for items in H to nd which agent is ge ing what item. Now, we are ready to exactly specify what are the necessary and su cient conditions for the prices in each cell to be the equilibrium prices. is process is summarized in the following lemma. L 3.9. Consider a structure of special items for agents, and shared items between agents (as de ned a er Lemma 3.8). Now consider a cell in the space of variables of agent utilities, prices of the special items, and allocation shares of the shared items, de ned by the polynomials that help de ne prices of all items. e prices and allocation of this cell forms an equilibrium, if and only if the allocation de ned above satis es the following constraints 1. All the items get fully allocated to agents.
Each agent gets exactly one unit of items.
3. For each agent i, the total cost of buying the items allocated to i is exactly 1.
4.
For each agent i, each of the items allocated to i is in one of her optimum bundles.
P
. ⇒ e rst, second and third condition follow from the market clearing conditions. e fourth condition directly follows from part c of lemma 3.2. ⇐ From the rst and second condition, we know that the pricing and allocation are market clearing. From the second, third and fourth condition, and the argument in proof of part c of lemma 3.2 we know that the allocation of items to each agent can be rewri en as her optimum bundles to her. So, from the de nition of optimum bundles we know that the allocation of items to agents is optimal. erefore, the prices and allocation are in equilibrium state.
e nal thing we need to do is to de ne a set of polynomials for checking the above conditions. e rst conditions holds for an item j, if summing up the share of each agent for that item, the sum is equal to C j . is can be handled by adding one polynomial for each item j.
e second condition holds for an agent i, if when we sum all the items (including the proportion of the shared items) that i gets, this sum is exactly 1. So we can also check this condition by adding a polynomial for each agent.
Note that we can do this since we explained how to nd out what is the allocation of items to agents for this cell. e third condition holds by Lemma 3.9 if multiplying the share of each agent for an item by its price and summing over all items, we get 1 for all the agents. We can do this by de ning a polynomial for each agent and checking its sign. e fourth condition is guaranteed to hold by de nition. e following theorem summarizes how we equilibria are cells of the constraints discussed throughout this section. T 3.10. Consider an equilibrium structure, and the space of the O(n) variables for agents' utilities and price of one special item in each agent's optimum bundle, the O(n 2 ) variables for allocation of shared items between the agent. Divide this space into cells by the signs of the polynomials de ned in the previous section, along with the O(m 2 + n) polynomials de ned just above, for checking the existence of the special equilibrium allocation. e sign of these polynomials fully determines either that the vectors in this cell can be extended to form equilibria.
Using this structure eorem allows us to prove eorem 3.1. Proof of eorem 3.1. We use theorem 2.1 as the base of our algorithm. We start by xing the structure of the equilibrium, selecting a single item from the optimum bundles of each agent, and selecting xing 5 items shared for every pair of agents. We check all the possible combinations, at most O(m n+5n 2 ) options, which is polynomial in m for xed n.
For a given equilibrium structure, we use the O(n) variables, the agent utilities, and O(mn) polynomials de ned in section 3.1 to nd a set of candidate bundles for each agent. en we use an additional O(n) variables, the prices of the special items for each agent, and O(mn 2 ) polynomials in order to nd a formula for the prices and the set of optimum Session 4a: Matching 2 EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA bundles of each agent in each cell. Finally, we use the last set of O(n 2 ) variables, the assignments of shared items, and O(m 2 + n) additional polynomials, in order to check whether the set of prices in the feasible cell are equilibrium prices with the given structure. e degree of the de ned polynomials is polynomial. We check all the non-empty cells of the resulting system, taking time polynomial on m for any xed n by eorem 2.1. Since the equilibrium exists, it should be in one of the non-empty cells.
Finally, if the prices of the cell are equilibrium prices, we take any vector from that cell, and extend it to get an equilibrium pricing and allocation. A er we have the equilibrium prices p, we can also nd each agent's allocation by nding a solution of the following set of inequalities.
b ∈B i
In which, x bi is the amount of bundle b used by agent i. Note that since we know this bundling is associated with an equilibrium, the feasible region of the above inequalities is not empty. Finally, the allocation of each agent i for item j in this equilibrium is
x ib
Relaxing Full Budget Spent Assumption of Agents in Equilibria
So far, we have assumed each agent fully spend her budget and introduced an algorithm for nding an equilibrium with this assumption. While equilibria where all agents spend their budget do exists (as shown in Appendix C of the full version of this paper [3] ), there may be equilibria where not all agents spend their budgets. In this section, we describe how the same algorithm can be modi ed to nd an equilibrium which does not require this assumption. e following lemma shows that if an agent does not fully spend her budget in an equilibrium, she will get exactly one unit of her most desired item, hence she cannot get any part of the other items. Recall that we assume that for each agent, her most preferred item is unique. L 3.11. In an equilibrium, with price vector p and equilibrium allocation x, for each agent i whose most preferred item is j, if i does not fully spend her one unit of money then x i j = 1.
P
. We use contradiction. Assume i is not fully spend her budget in an equilibrium, but there exists an item z such that x iz > 0 and z is not her most preferred item. Let b i be i's le over money and j be her most preferred item.
If p z ≥ p j then i can trade her share of item z for the same amount of item j and increase her utility, which contradicts the equilibrium condition. If p z < p j then, since i has b i unit of extra money, i can a ord to trade min(
unit of item z with the same amount of item j and increase her utility. is contradicts the fact that in equilibrium, utility of each agent should be optimum and we are done.
Since the number of agents is xed, we can iterate over all the 2 n se ings each of which tells us whether each agent fully spend her budget or not. In each se ing, before we start the algorithm, for each agent that does not fully spent Session 4a: Matching 2 EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA her budget, we remove one unit from her most preferred item. From lemma 3.11 we know that if this se ing leads to an equilibrium, this will be the only valid allocation of items to these agents. We also remove these agents themselves and continue the algorithm assuming all the remaining agents fully spend their budget as before. If in a se ing, enough of the most preferred items of the agents who do not fully spend their budget is not available, then it simply means that the se ing cannot lead to an equilibrium, so we ignore the se ing and iterate to the next one.
Note that if an agent is not fully spending her budget, from lemma 3.11 we know that the price of her most preferred item should be at most 1. erefore, in our algorithm a er formulating the prices in the algorithm (described in section 3.1), for each item that was partially allocated to the agents who do not fully spent their budget, we add a constraint that its price should be at most 1. en we continue with the algorithm to nd the equilibrium given the initial se ing.
Because such equilibrium always exists, at least one of the initial se ings will lead to nding an equilibrium price vector and allocation.
